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Abstract: Seng Zhao and his collection of treatises, the Zhao lun, have enjoyed a particularly high
reputation in the history of Chinese Buddhism. One of these treatises, The Immutability of Things,
employs the Madhyamaka argumentative method of negating dualistic concepts to demonstrate that,
while “immutability” and “mutability” coexist as the states of phenomenal things, neither possesses
independent self-nature. More than a thousand years after this text was written, Zhencheng’s intense
criticism of it provoked fierce reactions among a host of renowned scholar–monks. This paper
explores Zhencheng’s main points as well as the perspectives and motives of his principal adversaries
in order to shed light on the nature of philosophical discourse during the late Ming dynasty.
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1. Introduction
The Zhao lun肇論, authored by Seng Zhao (僧肇; 374–414),1 has long been regarded as concrete
proof that early fifth-century indigenous Chinese monks not only understood the core principles of the
Madhyamaka philosophy of Mahāyāna Buddhism, but could also express such notions in the idiom of
contemporary Neo-Daoist discourse. However, while modern Western scholars have made full use of
mid-twentieth-century translations of the Zhao lun to explore Seng Zhao’s thinking,2 few have shown
any interest in the text’s profound impact on Buddhist philosophical discourse during the late Ming
dynasty (1572–1620).3 Initiated by Kongyin Zhencheng (空印鎮澄; 1547–1617; hereafter Zhencheng),
who challenged one of Seng Zhao’s four main treatises, the Zhao lun debate ultimately preoccupied a
wide range of Buddhist monks over the course of several decades.
Zhencheng, a monk who devoted himself to the doctrinal study of the Huayan school華嚴宗
of Buddhism,4 wrote an article entitled A Logical Investigation of the Immutability of Things (Wu buqian
zhengliang lun物不遷正量論; hereafter A Logical Investigation), in which he expressed fundamental
1 According to Robinson (1958–1959, pp. 99–120), “Tsukamoto Zenryū [ . . . ] establishes these dates as more probable than the
traditional ones (384–414).”
2 Tsukamoto (1955) and Walter Liebenthal (1968) Japanese and English translations of the Zhao lun prompted discussions on
some fundamental aspects of Seng Zhao’s treatises, primarily their Neo-Daoist elements (Tsukamoto 1955, pp. 113–65) and
mystical tendencies (Liebenthal 1968, pp. 26–27). Neither author cast any doubt on the widely accepted view that the Zhao
lun played a pivotal role in the history of Chinese Buddhism.
3 Here, “late Ming dynasty” roughly equates to the reign of Emperor Wanli萬曆帝 (1572–1620). Sheng’s (2006, p. 3) definition
of “late Ming” is slightly more specific: 1573–1619.
4 Yixue義學 (“doctrinal study”) generally refers to the systematic, scholarly study of a particular doctrine of Buddhism, such
as Huayan華嚴宗, Yogācāra, and Tiantai天台宗, in contrast to the meditation practices of Chan禪 Buddhism.
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disagreement with the notion of the “immutability of things” (wu buqian lun物不遷論)—the subject and
title of one of Seng Zhao’s most famous treatises. This critique was not only eloquent but bold, given
almost every Chinese Mahāyāna faction’s reverence for Seng Zhao and his ideas at the time, and it
generated fierce and widespread criticism among many of Zhencheng’s monastic contemporaries. For
instance, Hanshan Deqing (憨山德清; 1546–1623; hereafter Deqing), one of the most famous Chan禪
monks of the late Ming period, recorded an animated conversation in which he expressed his support
for Seng Zhao:
I once talked about this with a friend. This friend firmly disagreed. On the contrary, he
regarded Master Zhao as “non-Buddhist” (waidao) with a one-sided view. He widely cited
Buddhist doctrines to refute him. Even venerable Buddhist monks, such as Yunqi, Zibo, and




The friend in question was none other than Zhencheng himself.
Rather than viewing the debate over Zhencheng’s article as a singular event, it should be
understood as embedded within the Buddhist “revitalization” (Sheng 2006, p. 3) or “reformation”
(Jiang 2006, pp. 367–71) of the late Ming dynasty. A Logical Investigation was the product of an open
scholarly atmosphere and a theoretical crisis of legitimacy that various Buddhist schools experienced
at that time.
In this paper, we shall (a) reconstruct the arguments expressed within The Immutability of Things,
A Logical Investigation and the responses of Zhencheng’s principal contemporary opponents; (b) reveal
how these works’ contrasting perspectives reflect divergent intellectual atmospheres and backgrounds
throughout China’s Buddhist schools and across historical periods; and thus (c) summarize the internal
and external reasons for the schools’ disagreements over the issue of “immutability”. Methods of
internal and external analysis will be employed to gain a deeper understanding of the various texts’
philosophical viewpoints and the contexts in which they were written, and to illuminate the complex
evolution of the meaning of “immutability” in the intellectual history of Chinese Buddhism.
2. Context and Content of The Immutability of Things
Factors such as Indian Buddhism, the early stages of Chinese Buddhism, and Neo-Daoism during
the Wei and Jin dynasties (third–fifth centuries) must be taken into account when considering the
ideological background of Seng Zhao and his treatises. According to his biography in the Gaoseng
zhuan高僧傳, Seng Zhao was already familiar with Neo-Daoist interpretations of the pre-Qin classics,
mainly the Laozi老子 and the Zhuangzi莊子, in his youth, prior to reading the Vimalakı̄rti-nirdeśa-sūtra
(Weimo jing維摩經) and studying Buddhism under the famous translator Kumārajı̄va (344–413).6 From
404 CE onwards, he assisted his master in translating various Mahāyāna Buddhist scriptures.7 It was
during and after this decade of translation work that Seng Zhao wrote four treatises with a view to
explaining four fundamental Madhyamaka concepts—immutability (buqian不遷), emptiness (śūnyatā,
kong空), ultimate wisdom (prajñā, bore般若), and nirvana (nirvān. a, niepan涅槃)—to Chinese audiences.
The sequence in which these four treatises are presented today does not reflect their composition: The
5 CBETA 2019.Q3, X54, no. 873, p. 336c22–24; R96, p. 590b7–9; Z 2:1, p. 295d7–9. The meaning of the phrase yijian waidao
一見外道 is unclear, not least because it does not appear in A Logical Investigation itself. Deqing most likely used it to
summarize Zhencheng’s opinion that The Immutability of Things is biased and therefore violates the core teachings of
Mahāyāna Buddhism. Jian見 equates to dr, s. ţi—a one-sided, partial, prejudiced, limited idea, opinion, or point of view.
6 CBETA 2020.Q1, T50, no. 2059, p. 365a9–22.
7 CBETA 2019.Q3, T45, no. 1858, p. 157a20–21.
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Immutability of Things appears first in modern editions of the Zhao lun even though it was written
around 410 CE, after the treatises on emptiness and ultimate wisdom (Liebenthal 1968, pp. 9–10).
Prior to Kumārajı̄va’s arrival in China from Kucha, Chinese Buddhist scholars had formed
the so-called “six houses and seven schools” (liujia 六家/qizong 七宗), based on their contrasting
exegeses or theories (yi 義) concerning the concept of emptiness. These included theories of “the
non-existence of mind” (xinwu yi 心無義), “matter as such”, or “identity with matter” (jise yi 即色
義) and “fundamental non-existence” (benwu yi本無義). However, none of the proponents of these
theories precisely comprehended the true meaning of emptiness from a Mahāyāna perspective, because
they all interpreted the nature of things as either existent or non-existent.8 Consequently, in his treatise
on emptiness, Seng Zhao first criticized such partial views for clinging to either eternalism or nihilism,
then proposed an understanding of the Middle Way (madhyama-pratipad, zhongdao中道) on the basis
of “dependent arising” (pratı̄tya-samutpāda, yuanqi 緣起) and by means of Nāgārjuna’s method of
argumentation. In short, he demonstrated that since all things are subject to dependent arising, they
lack “self-nature” (svabhāva/ātman, zixing自性) and have no permanent, independent, continuous, or
immutable substance. Kumārajı̄va expressed his great appreciation of this theory, stating that “my
interpretation is identical, while my refinement in literary expression cannot compare to yours”.9
In the meantime, with his “correction” of earlier exegeses of emptiness, Seng Zhao played an
important role in summarizing and developing Neo-Daoist thinking. Indeed, his criticism of the
“six houses and seven schools” contained an implicit challenge to the Neo-Daoist theoretical modes
of “existence” (you 有) and “non-existence” (wu 無) represented by Guo Xiang (郭象; c. 252–312)
and Wang Bi (王弼; 226–249), respectively, because the early Chinese Buddhist schools rooted their
metaphysical assumptions in these Neo-Daoist notions. By repeatedly quoting both the Laozi and
the Zhuangzi in his treatises, Seng Zhao revealed his intention to transcend Neo-Daoist metaphysics
through reinterpretation of its classics.
More specifically, while the title The Immutability of Things seems to be fairly concise and clear, it is
actually rather misleading, given what follows in the text. The subject—wu物 (“thing”)—had a wide
range of meanings in Chinese philosophical literature prior to Seng Zhao’s time. As Yuan Kang元康
(active 627–649) of the Tang dynasty and his famous Japanese disciple Anchō (安澄; 763–814) explain in
their commentaries on the Madhyamaka-śāstra (Zhong lun中論; hereafter MMK), “Zhuangzi said, ‘All of
those that possess the appearance, image, colour, and sound are wu.’ Gongsun Longzi公孫龍子 stated
in On Name and Substance (Ming shi lun名實論), ‘What sky and earth produce is wu.’”10 Furthermore,
8 Seng Zhao intensively summarized and evaluated these three schools in the treatise On Śūnyatā (Bu zhen kong lun不真空
論). Unfortunately, very few of the schools’ own texts survive, although Tang (1955) and Liebenthal (1968) were able to
provide some valuable insights into their thinking after careful study of this scant source material. Zürcher (1972) then built
on Tang and Liebenthal’s efforts, compared the ideas of the Buddhist schools with those of the Neo-Daoists, and pointed
out the Buddhists’ limitations in terms of their understanding of the concept of “emptiness” as found in the Mahāyāna
sūtras. First, he suggested that proponents of xinwu yi心無義 recognized “matter” (rūpa, se色) as a real entity endowed with
objective existence, whereas the term “emptiness” refers to the mind of the sage that is “non-existence” (wu無) in so far as it
is free from all conscious thought, desire, and attachment. This theory seems to be related to a Neo-Daoist trend known as
“the exaltation of existence” (chong you崇有), which concerns the inner “emptiness” and “mental immunity” of the sage
in his contact with the world of “existence” (you有) (pp. 101–2). Second, Zürcher argued that advocates of jise yi即色義
held that “matter” exists ‘as such (i.e., it lacks any permanent substrate, any sustaining or creative principle that “causes
matter to be matter”). This comprised a Buddhist elaboration of Xiang Xiu向秀 and Guo Xiang郭象’s theory that all things
spontaneously exist by themselves, and that there is no creative power or a permanent substance behind things. Seng Zhao
severely criticized this notion on the basis that it dealt only with the conditional and causal nature of all phenomena and
failed to appreciate the ultimate truth that conditionality and causality themselves are mere names without any underlying
reality (pp. 123–24). Third, Zürcher pointed out that members of the benwu yi本無義 school considered benwu as the true
nature of all phenomena—an absolute that underlies the worldly truth. This notion comes nearest to the true meaning of
the Prajñāpāramitā doctrine as revealed by Kumārajı̄va, but it seems to conflate the Daoist idealized tohu-va-bohu and the
Mahāyāna concept of the “nature of all dharmas” (pp. 191–92).
9 吾解不謝子。辭當相挹。 CBETA 2019.Q3, T50, no. 2059, p. 365a25–26.
10 而言物不遷論者。元康師云。莊子云。凡有貌像色聲者。皆物也。公孫龍子名實論云。天與地。其所焉物也。 http:
//21dzk.l.u-tokyo.ac.jp/SAT/T2255_.65.0112b18:0112b20.cit.
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wu is even used in a discussion of the Dao道 (“Way”) in the Laozi.11 In general, in traditional Chinese
texts, wu may refer to anything that a human can perceive either abstractly or concretely, or anything
that exists objectively in the cosmos. The most credible Buddhist synonym is dharma (fa法) in the sense
of “phenomenon or constituent of existence”. However, there is a stronger implicit meaning in wu
that it is rooted in the ontological origin of the “sky and earth” or the Dao, and thus objectively exists
with self-nature in the world of time and space. By contrast, in Madhyamaka Buddhist discourse, the
dharma lacks inherent identity and manifests emptiness of the nature of things. That said, even though
Seng Zhao used wu, rather than fa, in the title of his treatise, we should probably not interpret this as a
tacit acknowledgement of the objective existence or inherent identity of things. Instead, it seems more
likely that he simply chose a word that he knew his Chinese readership would understand.
The phrase buqian不遷 (“immutable” or “immutability”) was much less common in pre-Zhao
lun Chinese Buddhist texts than a number of quasi-synonyms and related expressions, such as zhu住
(“abide”), budong不動 (“non-movement”), and buqu bulai不去不來 (“not leaving and not coming”).
Buqian itself probably derives from one of the seven inner chapters of the Zhuangzi, in which an ideal
person is described as someone whose “judgement is fixed with respect to the fact that there is no
element of falsehood; and, while other things are mutable, he is not”.12 Here, Zhuangzi means that a
sage’s cognition is immutable in the sense that he is able to perceive the unchanging nature of things
and so is not confused by superficial phenomena in constant motion. Having extracted the term
buqian from this passage, Seng Zhao uses it to denote a particular state of things—immutability—that
existed before any sage was able to perceive or understand it. So, does this mean that Seng Zhao
hoped to demonstrate the “immutability of things”? Not exactly, as is evident in the titles of the other
three treatises in Zhao lun. For example, On Prajñā without Knowing (Bore wuzhi lun,般若無知論) does
not suggest that his intention was to interpret prajñā, or ultimate wisdom, as “not-knowing”, nor as
“knowing” in the sense of ordinary knowledge. Rather, Seng Zhao praises “unknowing/not-knowing
knowledge” (buzhi zhi zhi, 不知之知)—that is, impartial cognition by transcending both knowing
and not-knowing. This also holds true for The Immutability of Things: while the title mentions only
“immutability”, the text advocates overcoming and transcending the dualistic notions of both mutability
and immutability.
It might be assumed that Seng Zhao discusses two dimensions—space and time—in The
Immutability of Things, but in fact he focuses exclusively on the latter. That said, the word “time” is
inadequate in this context, because in Buddhist philosophy, time is merely a fictive concept in ordinary
people’s minds through which they perceive changes in aspects of the phenomenal world.13 Therefore,
although Liebenthal (1968, p. 45) freely translates the title as “On Time”, he notes: “Lit. ‘things cannot
alter (their positions in the temporal order)’.” This explanation is more consistent with the content
of the treatise. Similar topics are discussed in several chapters of the MMK, including “Examination
of Movement and Non-movement (Gatāgata-parı̄ks. ā)” (Chapter 2), “Examination of Action and the
Agent (Karma-kāraka-parı̄ks. ā)” (Chapter 8), “Examination of Action and the Agent (Sam. skāra-parı̄ks. ā)”
(Chapter 13), “Examination of Time (Kāla-parı̄ks. ā)” (Chapter 19), and “Examination of Occurrence and
Dissolution (Sam. bhava-vibhava-parı̄ks. ā)” (Chapter 21) (Kalupahana 1986, pp. 118, 180, 217, 275, 292). In
Chapter 2, Nāgārjuna advances his thoughts through a sophisticated form of argumentation: to prove
that “movement” is a false assumption, he divides it into three aspects—the mover, the moving time,
and the act of moving—discusses each of these in turn as if they truly exist in the sense of self-nature,
and finally renders all of them non-viable. Seng Zhao not only developed Nāgārjuna’s ideas and
methodology on the basis of a comprehensive and integrated understanding of his predecessor’s
11 Laozi 21.2: “The Way as a thing is vague, ah, diffuse, ah” (道之物,惟恍惟惚). Laozi 25.1: “There is a thing that completes out
of the diffuse. It is born before Heaven and Earth [ . . . ] I do not know its name. Therefore, forced, I give it the style ‘dao’”
(有物混成,先天地生 [ . . . ]吾不知其名,字之曰道). Translations by Wagner (2000, pp. 297, 283).
12 審乎無假,而不與物遷。 https://ctext.org/zhuangzi/seal-of-virtue-complete#n2748.
13 For a comparative study of Buddhist and Christian philosophies relating to the concept of “time”, see Li and Dessein (2015).
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work—specifically, by devising the theory of dependent arising and disproving his opponents’ false
assumptions—but also used expressions that corresponded to contemporary Neo-Daoist conventions.
The Immutability of Things first presents then explicitly repudiates the “generally accepted
proposition” (ren zhi changqing 人之常情) that “things glide along (in the flow of time)” (you wu
liudong有物流動). Next, Seng Zhao introduces two popular Neo-Daoist notions—"movement and
stillness” (dong/jing動/靜)—and explains that “’non-moving’ here does not mean that motion must
cease in order to produce rest but that there is rest with motion going on” (豈釋動以求靜,必求靜於諸
動; Liebenthal 1968, p. 45). This brief summary (illustrated in Figure 1) is crucial when examining the
validity of Seng Zhao’s argument, which proceeds as follows:
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Figure 1. Seng Zhao’s line of arguments concerning the mutability and immutability of things.
This simple, four-step diagram encapsulates Seng Zhao’s reasoning in The Immutability of Things.
First, he articulates his opponents’ position: “[F]rom the fact that what once has been cannot join what
is now, they infer that things move. So they say: they move and are not at rest” (Liebenthal 1968,
p. 47). This is Premise 1. He continues: “[T]hey know that past things cannot come [to the present],
while thinking that the present things can pass [over to the past].”14 The first half of this sentence
merely reiterates Premise 1, whereas the second half comprises Premise 2. (Of course, as Seng Zhao is
concerned only with time, not space, the “movement” he describes here relates to changes in a thing’s
characteristics as time goes by, not to any changes in its position.) Thus, according to Seng Zhao, the
“generally accepted proposition” of mutability is: as things cannot proceed from past to present, some
attributes of the subjects will disappear in a certain temporal point of “present”; thus, things are always
changing. At the same time, as things can leave the present and move into the past, a present thing can
be traced back to an earlier, partially different version of itself in the past; therefore, it has changed. At
first glance, Premise 2 may seem far removed from our everyday experience, but it actually describes
the common practice of remembering things. Seng Zhao provides a useful example: a brahman
(brāman, a, fanzhi梵志) left home as a youngster and eventually returned as a white-haired old man. His
neighbors asked him whether the previous brahman still existed, whereupon the brahman answered,
“I am similar o the previous man, but not exactly him” (Liebenthal 1968, p. 50). In this hypothetical
situation, the neighbors recalled the previous bra man hrough the present brahman, and they used
that memory to think that the present person could be traced back to the same person living in an
earlier time, even though he looked much older than before. In the process of recalling, they supposed
an unchangeable subject—“brahman”—but also certain changeable aspects of that subject, such as the
color of his hair.
14 既知往物而不來, 而謂今物而可往. We modified Liebenthal’s (1968, p. 47) translation by deleting his supplementary
bracketed information and rendering the original Chinese more literally. Liebenthal added the dimension of space in his
understanding of the relationship between things in the past and present; however, we believe it is unnecessary to include
this additional information.
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The same reasoning is evident in Premise 1. When people say that things change because some
properties of those things disappear over time, they presuppose an unchanging subject with changing
properties. The Madhyamaka concept of “emptiness” repudiates this notion of an unchanging,
independent, continuous subject, yet Seng Zhao does not criticize the unconscious presupposing
in these first two premises. Rather, he simply points out that they are inherently contradictory: “If
past things cannot come, where should present things go to?”15 With this echo-question, he seems
to suggest that the movement of things in the flow of time should be bidirectional. Thus, if people
claim that “past things cannot come to the present”, they should not recall the young brahman when
seeing the old brahman who stands before them, because they have already presupposed that the
young brahman cannot come to the present. It is in this way that Seng Zhao disproves “the generally
accepted proposition” of mutability: “Thereby it becomes clear that no intercourse is possible between
things belonging to different time periods” (Liebenthal 1968, p. 48).
After refuting the notion that things can move in the flow of time, Seng Zhao naturally arrives
at Premise 3: things permanently abide in the time points (where they belong) or things cannot alter
(their positions in the temporal order). He terms this characteristic either “nature abides” (xingzhu性
住) or “immutability” (buqian不遷). One might expect his next step to be a thorough repudiation of this
notion of “immutability”, because only by negating both “mutability” and “immutability” (opposite
dualistic concepts belonging to the phenomenal world) will the Middle Way leading to emptiness—that
is, the absolute truth beyond all relativity—become apparent. However, he not only neglects to do
this, but even hints at tacit approval of the concept when stating, “[N]othing can move (from its
position in time). Therefore, each nature abides permanently in one time period”16 and “[E]ach nature
abides (permanently) in one time period.”17 Nevertheless, in Step 3, he does deny both mutability and
immutability. For example, he states, “(Things are) immutable, so (they) leave while always being still;
(things do) not abide, so (they) are still while always moving. (Things) are still while always leaving,
thus (they) move without mutability; (things) are leaving while always being still, thus (they are) still
while not staying.”18 With his assertion that mutability and immutability coexist as things’ phenomenal
characteristics, Seng Zhao rejects the possibility of either existing independently and self-reliantly, and
thereby denies the self-nature of both, and guides his readers towards the notion of emptiness.
Overall, The Immutability of Things reflects a rigorous phenomenological standpoint that accords
with Nāgārjuna’s understanding of emptiness: never suppose any metaphysical essence as the basis of
this phenomenal world. Seng Zhao’s thinking and methodology both conform to the requirements of
the Middle Way, with the only “flaw” in his treatise being his failure to disprove immutability—an
apparent oversight that he could have resolved through further Middle Way analysis. Similar to how
Nāgārjuna demonstrates that movement is a false illusion in people’s perception, Seng Zhao could
have divided immutability into three distinct aspects—the subject that stays, the time point in which it
stays, and the act of staying—in order to prove that each aspect has no self-nature and, consequently,
that immutability itself has no independent self-nature.
So, why did Seng Zhao neglect to do this? One possibility is that, having summarized his
opponents’ position as “all things move unceasingly”, he decided to build his counter-argument on
the polar opposite of immutability. Moreover, “stillness and movement”—a Neo-Daoist expression
that was particularly popular in Seng Zhao’s time—was frequently used in place of both “roots and
15 往物既不來,今物何所往? Liebenthal (1968, p. 47).
16 不動,故各性住於一世. Liebenthal (1968, p. 51). Xing性 (“nature”) is an abbreviation of wuxing物性 (“nature of a thing”),
mentioned above, or shixing事性 (“nature of an event”), mentioned below, and therefore should be understood as the thing
or event itself, rather than any essential or substantial “nature” of it.
17 事各性住於一世. Liebenthal (1968, p. 52). Once again, we have modified Liebenthal’s translation for the reason given in
note 14.
18 不遷, 故雖往而常靜; 不住,故雖靜而常往。雖靜而常往,故往而弗遷; 雖往而常靜, 故靜而弗留矣. Liebenthal (1968, p. 49)
came close to rewriting this section, so we have used our own, more literal translation. In The Immutability of Things, qian遷
(“mutability”) is synonymous with dong動 (“movement”), lai來 (“come”), and wang往 (“leave”); its antonym, buqian不遷
(“immutability”), is synonymous with jing (“stillness”), zhu住 (“abide”), and liu留 (“stay”).
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branches” (ben mo本末) and “essence and function” (ti yong體用). For example, Wang Bi assumed
that “to reach emptiness is (their) ultimate; to hold on to stillness is (their) blessing. Even while the
ten thousand kinds of entities may all act at once, they eventually return to emptiness and stillness.
This is called ‘the ultimate returning of things’.”19 With all this in mind, Seng Zhao’s primary goal
may have been to prove that stillness (or immutability) is one of the characteristics of all things in
the phenomenal world,20 as opposed to a state that only sages can perceive and comprehend or the
original root of all things.
3. Zhencheng’s Criticism and Proposition
No later than the end of the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279), Chinese Buddhism entered a
period of relative decline that continued until Emperor Wanli’s reign in the late Ming era (1572–1620),
when Buddhism entered an era of revitalization and reformation. The revival was stimulated by the
Emperor himself and his mother, known as Madame Li (1546–1614), who was a devout follower of
Buddhism. Generous imperial donations facilitated the rapid recovery of Buddhist communities, the
renovation of Buddhist institutions and the printing and distribution of Buddhist scriptures. One
important aspect of Buddhism’s resurgence in this period was that it was “heralded by the rise of
Buddhist scholasticism”, which could be viewed as evidence that “doctrinal studies (yixue義學) are
much more enduring than other sectarian establishments” (Jiang 2008, pp. 24–25). In the late Ming era,
while mainstream Buddhism was still Chan, some Buddhist scholars started to devote themselves
to doctrinal studies, represented by the Huayan, Yogācāra, and Tiantai traditions. The debate over
Seng Zhao’s The Immutability of Things, initiated by Zhencheng and perpetuated by many other famous
scholar–monks, was a significant event in this “rise of Buddhist scholasticism”.
However, beneath the surface of revitalization, there was a theoretical crisis of legitimacy within
the late Ming Buddhist scholastic community. Indeed, the imperial court’s patronage exacerbated this
crisis, as it prompted a fierce dispute between the government and the Buddhist community—as well
as among the various branches of the Buddhist community—over the admission of genealogies of
dharma transmission (Jiang 2008). Buddhism’s decline during the Yuan (1271–1368) and early–middle
Ming (1368–1572) led to a deterioration in the quality of dharma heirs and a hiatus in the transmission of
Buddhist scriptures. Buddhist scholars of the late Ming era acknowledged these issues and attempted
to address them, but they could not agree on a single approach: while Chan monks retained faith in
the personal experience of enlightenment, devotees of doctrinal studies searched for answers in the
philosophical theories of the scriptures. Zhencheng was just one of many monks who favored the latter
approach, with a particular focus on the works of Huayan scholars of the Tang dynasty (618–907). In
addition, he collected some fragments of Yogācāra scriptures and explored that tradition’s philosophy
of logic.21
Zhencheng’s critique of The Immutability of Things was inspired by an ambiguous and somewhat
contradictory paragraph in the Huayan jing suishu yanyi chao華嚴經隨疏演義鈔, a detailed commentary
on the Avatam. saka sūtra by Qingliang Chengguan (清涼澄觀; 738–839; hereafter Chengguan), the fourth
patriarch of the Huayan school during the Tang dynasty:
19 凡有起於虛,動起於靜,故萬物雖並動作,卒復歸於虛靜,是物之極復也. This is Wang Bi’s reinterpretation of Laozi 16.3: 致虛
極,守靜篤,萬物並作,吾以觀復. According to Wagner (2000, p. 277), Wang Bi made a small alteration that had a substantial
impact on the overall meaning: (1) it becomes clear that the “simultaneous action” of the ten thousand kinds of entities
stands in contrast to emptiness (xu ) and stillness (jing ); and (2) the entities’ emptiness and stillness are not immediately
apparent in their presence, but rather perceived by the philosophical eye as their ultimate aim. Wagner’s analysis supports
our proposal that Neo-Daoist metaphysical scholars used “movement and stillness” to denote “roots and branches” (ben
mo本末) and “essence and function” (ti yong體用), and to emphasize the veracity of sagely cognition.
20 Li and Dessein (2015, p. 171) liken this to a movie: “every frame of a movie stays in its position without leaving, but when
cast on a screen, the spectator has the impression of continuity”.
21 Buddhist logic (hetu-vidyā, yinming因明) was one of the five branches of science (pañca-vidyā, wu ming五明) in ancient India.
Although generally regarded as a philosophical method rather than a distinct Buddhist school, it has been widely used in
the Yogācāra tradition.
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(The Immutability of Things) furthermore said, “As (what has occurred in) ancient times cannot
occur (again) in our time, and (what occurs) to-day cannot have occurred in ancient times,
(or else) as the nature of each thing abides in (its period), what, then, is able to move freely to
and fro (among the historical periods)?” (Liebenthal 1968, p. 52) Analysis: since Master Zhao
intended to regard “each nature of thing abides” as “immutability”, this is no different from
the notion that “(the conditioned things) cannot move to anywhere else from here” in the
Small Vehicle (Hı̄nayāna). Next, (The Immutability of Things) said, “Therefore, when he (the
Sage) has in mind the final truth (paramārtha-satya), he says that (things) do not move; when
he teaches conventional truth (sam. vr. ti-satya), he says that everything flows” (Liebenthal
1968, p. 50). This is regarding the ultimate truth as “immutability”, while not showing the
characteristic of the ultimate truth. If (Master Zhao) used “the nature of each thing abides” as
the characteristic of the ultimate truth, why did (he) not (state that) there is nothing mutable
because of “emptiness of nature”? It is only in the treatise of On Śūnyatā that the meaning
of “emptiness of nature” appears. (By contrast, in The Immutability of Things, Master Zhao)





In this passage, although Chengguan initially associates Seng Zhao’s account of “the nature of each
thing abides” with the unenlightened teachings of Hı̄nayāna, he then acknowledges that Seng Zhao’s
dichotomic explanation of “immutability” and “mutability” accords with twofold-truth teaching.23
However, Zhencheng cites only the first part of this paragraph in his analysis of The Immutability of
Things: “[T]his is to say that the nature of each thing abides in one time period, without the possibility
to move freely to and fro (among the temporal periods). This is the real meaning of Master Zhao’s
Immutability of Things.”24 Therefore, according to Zhencheng’s reinterpretation of Chengguan’s analysis,
Seng Zhao’s proposition is “immutability” and his main proof of it is “nature abides” (xingzhu性住),
as is evident in his assertion that “the abiding nature is immutable性住不遷”. This brief statement
is the principal focus of Zhencheng’s critique of The Immutability of Things in A Logical Investigation.
Thereafter, he presents his own “correct” proof of the “immutability” proposition by declaring that
“the emptiness of nature is immutable”.25
22 CBETA 2019.Q3, T36, no. 1736, p. 239b23–c1. Chengguan mentions the teaching of the Small Vehicle, which can be found in
Chapter 4 of the Abhidharmakośa-bhās.ya during a discussion of the concept of karman (ye業). The exposition of the verse
states, “(The conditioned phenomena) are produced here and are destroyed right here (i.e., they just exist for an instant).
They cannot move to anywhere else from here”若此處生即此處滅。無容從此轉至余方; CBETA 2020.Q1, T29, no. 1558, p.
67c14). It affirms the non-continuity of the body (shen身) on the timeline, thus denying the body’s motion. On the surface,
this is similar to Seng Zhao’s explanation of “nature abides” (xingzhu性住), but the Abhidharmakośa-bhās.ya espouses the
substantiality of things and the true existence of past, present, and future, whereas Seng Zhao’s explanation stands on the
basis of emptiness in the nature of things.
23 Basically, in Buddhism, the twofold-truth (satya-dvaya) encompasses the ultimate truth (paramârtha-satya, zhendi真諦) and
the conventional truth (sam. vr. ti-satya, sudi俗諦), although there are very different interpretations of these two truths in the
sūtras and śāstras of the Mahāyāna and Hı̄nayāna schools. For example, in the Madhyamaka philosophy of the Mahāyāna
tradition, the twofold-truth denotes emptiness in the self-nature of things and phenomenal illusions on the basis of the
theory of dependent arising; however, the Yogācāra school links the twofold-truth with the theory of “three natures” and
regards the perfectly accomplished nature, which is perceived in a non-discriminating mode of cognition, as the ultimate
truth. Meanwhile, in China, the Huayan school regards “principle” (li理) and “phenomena” (shi事), based on the division
of the “four dharma-realms”, as the ultimate and conventional truths, respectively; by contrast, in the Chan school, the
ultimate truth is always related to the functioning of the mind (xin心).
24 是謂物各性住於一世不相往來。此肇公不遷之本旨也。 CBETA 2019.Q3, X54, no. 879, p. 913c20v21; R97, p. 731b8–9; Z 2:2,
p. 366b8–9.
25 性空不遷。 CBETA 2019.Q3, X54, no. 879, pp. 913a09–19b22; R97, pp. 730a03–43a04; Z 2:2, pp. 365c03–72a04; CBETA
2019.Q3, X54, no. 879, pp. 919c04–26a22; R97, pp. 743a06–56a11; Z 2:2, pp. 372a06–78c11.
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To advance his case, Zhencheng applies the formal logic of the Yogācāra school, specifically a
three-part syllogism (sanzhi zuofa三支作法), which comprises pratijñā (thesis or proposition, zong宗),
hetu (reason, yin因) and udāharan. a (example, yu喻).26 This enables him to summarize Seng Zhao’s error
as follows: “The proposition is nearly right, but the reason is wrong宗似而因非”. Zhencheng explains:
“by ‘the proposition is nearly right’, I mean that motion does not cease in order to produce rest, and
that there is rest while motion continues; by ‘the reason is wrong’, (I mean that) the sūtras regard
the emptiness in the nature of dharmas as immutability, whereas Master Zhao regarded the abiding
nature as immutability”.27 Furthermore, “In order to prove ‘immutability’, Master Zhao thought that
previous things do not disappear and their nature abides in the past. This violates Mahāyāna teaching
on the emptiness of nature.”28
This analysis forms the basis of Zhencheng’s contention that The Immutability of Things violates both
the standard of authority (āpta-āgama, shengjiao liang聖教量) and the standard of inference (anumāna,
biliang 比量).29 He then provides several examples to illustrate why Seng Zhao’s interpretation of
“nature abides” contravenes these core components of Mahāyāna teaching.
a. The proposition that past things do not pass to the present does not prove immutability or
permanence but rather “impermanence”
Zhencheng accepts that past things do not join the present, but disagrees with the proposition that
this proves that immutability is an aspect of the nature of things. He defines past and present things
as “different things” (yiwu異物), and the past and the present as “different time periods” (yishi異世),
then demonstrates that any attempt to use yiwu and yishi to prove immutability, as per Seng Zhao’s
reasoning in The Immutability of Things, violates both the sūtras and Buddhist logic.30 Specifically, on
the subject of “different time periods”, he explains:
Now he (Master Zhao) says that past things abide in the past, while present things abide
in the present. If so, they are conditional dharmas, falling in (the realm of) moving to and
fro. Since (such a “thing”) falls under the three time periods (i.e., past, present, and future),
it is invalid for (Master Zhao) to call it “immutability”. Thus, the Nirvān. a sūtra claimed
that the dharma that permanently abides is not contained in the three times, and that the
Buddha’s dharma-body is not contained in the three times. It is not contained in the three
times, so it is called “permanent”. On the contrary, what is contained in the three times must




Later, when discussing “different things”, he asks:
26 The three-part syllogism and other Buddhist logic techniques entered the mainstream and were exported to China no later
than the lifetime of the Yogācāra philosopher Dignāga (Chen Na陳那). The “thesis” may be either one’s own notion or that
of an opponent; the “reason” is used to prove the thesis; and the “example” is usually well known as well as relevant to the
reason. See Wayman (1999, pp. 10–11).
27 言宗似者。即所謂不釋動以求靜。必求靜於諸動;言因非者。修多羅以諸法性空為不遷。肇公以物各性住為不遷。 CBETA
2019.Q3, X54, no. 879, p. 913a15–21; R97, p. 730a9–15; Z 2:2, p. 365c9–15.
28 肇公以昔物不滅。性住於昔。而說不遷。則於大乘性空之義背矣。 CBETA 2019.Q3, X54, no. 879, p. 914c3–4; R97, p.
733a9–10; Z 2:2, p. 367a9–10.
29 Generally, there are three means of valid cognition in Buddhist logic: “direct perception” (pratyaks.a, xianliang現量)—what is
not out of sight, not already inferred and not to be inferred, and non-delusory; “inference” (anumāna, biliang比量)—what
is addressed with the inferable or what has already been inferred, and the sense object that is inferable; and “argument
of authority” (āpta-āgama, shengjiao liang聖教量)—what was expressed by the Omniscient One, or heard from him, or is
therewith a consistent doctrine. For more detailed information, see Wayman (1999, pp. 12–26).
30 今以異物異世以釋不遷。教理俱違。 CBETA 2019.Q3, X54, no. 879, p. 914a24–b1; R97, p. 732a18–1: Z 2:2, p. 366c18–1.
31 CBETA 2019.Q3, X54, no. 879, p. 914b2–6; R97, p. 732b2–6; Z 2:2, p. 366d2–6.
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Question: How (do you) know that different things are all impermanent?
Answer: This rests on two assumptions. The first is the teaching of the sage. The holy
practices in the Nirvān. a sūtra extensively explain that different things are all impermanent.
The second is logical inference. There are no differences among the (different things’) natures
of emptiness, so (the emptiness) is named “permanence”. Every form or vessel/tool is
different from every other, so they are all “impermanent”. To discuss this difference in terms
of time, [ . . . ] (things) sometimes exist but sometimes do not, so they are impermanent. To




器異故諸皆無常。論異者。[ . . . ]時乎而有。時乎而無。故為無常。若橫論者。[ . . . ]有處而
有。有處而無。故名無常。32
As any concrete thing can occupy only one point in time and space, it will become another thing
when the time and space change, which leads Zhencheng to the inevitable conclusion that things in
the past and things in the present are definitely different. Moreover, this difference proves that the
nature of any concrete thing cannot be permanent, in the sense of retaining an inherently consistent
self. On the other hand, the nature of emptiness—the ultimate and universal truth in Mahāyāna
Buddhism—never differs in any time or place, so it is the only “thing” that exists permanently.
Therefore, Zhencheng criticizes Seng Zhao for terming conventional things—that is, things with
concrete characteristics—"immutable” (a synonym for “permanent”, according to Zhencheng).
b. The notion that past things existed previously and do not exist now is an extension of the illusion
of existence and non-existence
During his discussion of past and present things in The Immutability of Things, Seng Zhao uses a
pair of antonyms—being/exist (you有) and non-being/non-exist (wu無)—in the form of verbs: “looking
for a past thing in the time point where it once has been, the thing never fails to exist in the past” and
“looking for a past thing in the time point of the present, this thing has never existed in the present”.33
Zhencheng is especially critical of this approach on the grounds that Seng Zhao’s use of you and wu
might lead readers to one of two extreme views: either that things exist with an eternal essence, or
that their essence is destroyed at the precise moment when they fade from existence. Both of these
concepts conflict with basic Mahāyāna teaching on dependent arising and the emptiness of nature.
According to Zhencheng: “Holding on to the notion that the you truly exists is an absolute standpoint
of you that ignores the fact that dependently arisen things are empty in self-nature. Regarding the wu
as truly non-existing is an absolute standpoint of wu and ignores the fact that what has no self-nature
has dependently arisen.”34 Furthermore, given that Seng Zhao’s reasoning is clouded by eternal and
nihilistic tendencies, Zhencheng insists that his predecessor’s notion of “immutability” is incompatible
with “emptiness”, which must transcend both eternalism and nihilism. He explains: “The relationship
between emptiness and immutability is like that of light and dark: they are opposites conflicting with
each other.”35
Overall, Zhencheng criticizes Seng Zhao’s various errors in The Immutability of Things with
reference to the “four assumptions” (si ji四計):
32 CBETA 2019.Q3, X54, no. 879, p. 918c13–21; R97, p. 741b1–9; Z 2:2, p. 371b1–9.
33 求向物於向。於向未無。責向物於今。於今未有。 Liebenthal (1968, pp. 47–48).
34 執有為有。是為常有。不知緣性之本空。計無為無。是為斷無。不識無性之緣起。 CBETA 2019.Q3, X54, no. 879, p.
914a12–13; R97, p. 732a6–7; Z 2:2, p. 366c6–7.
35 性空性住如明與暗。敵體相違矣。 CBETA 2019.Q3, X54, no. 879, p. 914a19–20; R97, p. 732a13–14; Z 2:2, p. 366c13–14.
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Master Zhao’s “immutability”, generally speaking, displays four assumptions—namely
“existence”, “non-existence”, “sameness”, and “difference”. “Looking for a past thing in the
time point where it once was, the thing never fails to exist in the past.” This is the assumption
of “existence”. “Looking for a past thing in the time point of the present, this thing has never
existed in the present.” This is the assumption of “non-existence”. “The past thing was in
the past, while the present thing is in the present.” This is the assumption of “difference”.
Only the assumption of “sameness” is absent. All four of these assumptions can contaminate
prajñā teaching. [If a theory] includes any one of them, it violates prajñā teaching. So how




There are many contrasting interpretations of the “four assumptions” across several Buddhist
sūtras, and both “existence and non-existence” and “sameness and difference” were familiar concepts
in various Chinese Buddhist schools in the late Ming period, so it is impossible to determine which
of countless potential sources inspired Zhencheng to couch his criticism in these terms. That said,
he mentions that the “four assumptions” can contaminate prajñā teaching, so we may at least trace
the concept back to a basic principle in one of prajñā Buddhism’s most important sūtras— the “eight
negations of the Middle Way” (babu zhongdao 八不中道) in the MMK. These “eight negations” are
presented as four pairs of concepts: non-ceasing and non-arising; non-annihilation and non-permanence;
non-identity and non-difference; and non-appearance and non-disappearance.37 The opposites of
three of these pairs—ceasing and arising生滅, annihilation and permanence斷常, and appearance and
disappearance去來—relate to existence (that is, “existence” and “non-existence”), while the opposite of
the fourth—identity and difference一異—relates to the relationship between two things. In essence, all
eight negations emphasize the importance of avoiding extreme views when exploring things’ existence
as well as their relationships with other things. Zhencheng clearly believed that he could criticize The
Immutability of Things on the basis of the “four assumptions” as Seng Zhao had been viewed as an
authority on prajñā.
c. If past causes never cease or disappear (lit. transform), it is impossible for all beings to attain
Buddha-hood, and there will never be a point of time when through the cultivation of causes one
achieves the results38
At the end of The Immutability of Things, Seng Zhao states that the fact “that (the Buddha’s) karma
cannot perish implies that, though acquired in the past, it has not undergone any change功業不可朽,
故在昔而不化” (Liebenthal 1968, p. 52). Zhencheng interprets this assertion as follows: past things
or events, as causes, never disappear. Hence, they extend or pass into the present and the future,
leaving no time point for any results to arise. This leads to the inevitable conclusion that the ultimate
goal of becoming a Buddha—which Mahāyāna Buddhists believe is achieved through practice—is
actually unattainable. Zhencheng then offers an explanation as to why Seng Zhao might have made
this “mistake”:
“Permanence” has two meanings. One is the “immutable continuity”, meaning that thusness
(tathatā) is immutable. The Lengyan jing (Śūram. gama-sūtra) says, in the real and eternal nature,
(if people) look for enlightenment and illusion, birth and death, leaving and coming, (they)
36 CBETA 2020.Q3, X54, no. 879, p. 916a22-b2; R97, p. 736a16-2; Z 2:2, p. 368c16-2.
37 不生不滅。不不常。不一不異。不去不來。 For a detailed explanation, see Kalupahana (1986, p. 101).
38 若昔因不滅不化者。則眾生永無成佛之理。修因永無得果之期。 CBETA 2019.Q3, X54, no. 879, p. 914c10–12; R97,
p. 733a16–18; Z 2:2, p. 367a16–18.
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obtain nothing. The second is the “successive continuity”, meaning that the results of karma
are never lost. The Huayan jing (Buddhâvatam. saka-sūtra) says that the essence of the cause
disintegrates in every instant but accumulates successively, and the result never loses the
form (upon which it acts). The poetic verse says that it is clear that the cause disintegrates and
the result then aggregates. Because of the permeating power of the similar and immediately
antecedent conditions (samanantara-pratyaya) stored in the eight consciousnesses, when the
preceding instant of thought ceases, it permeates the subsequent instant of thought. Even
when the annihilation at the end of an age burns brightly, the results of karma are not lost.
Therefore, it is called the “successive continuity”. Thus, although (Master Zhao said that
“immutability”) is “clear”, it belongs to the conditional and changing dharmas. Master Zhao





In this lengthy paragraph, Zhencheng not only distinguishes between two distinct kinds of
“permanence”—the “immutable continuity” and the “successive continuity”—but also draws attention
to “thusness” and to the conditional and changing world that is restricted by the law of cause and
result. According to his analysis, Seng Zhao misunderstood the “permanence” of the law of cause
and result (or “successive continuity”) on the grounds that this relates only to never-ending karma,
not to unceasing past causes. In addition, he suggests that the law of cause and result cannot be
used to demonstrate “immutability” because only ultimate thusness (or “immutable continuity”) is
permanently immutable, while the law of cause and result applies only to dependently arisen things in
the “three time periods” (that is, the phenomenal world).
It is worth noting that Zhencheng mainly cites sūtras revered by the Huayan and Yogācāra
schools, not Madhyamaka scriptures, in his analysis of the “two kinds of permanence”. This is because
Madhyamaka texts do not consider thusness as an inner “real and eternal nature”. Chinese readers first
encountered the concept of Buddha-nature (Buddha-dhātu, foxing佛性) following the translation of the
Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvān. a sūtra in the early fifth century.40 Two sentences from this sūtra encapsulate
its main theme: “All sentient beings possess Buddha-nature. The Tathāgata is always abiding and
immutable.”41 The notion of Buddha-nature was then gradually combined with another Buddhist
concept—the twofold truth—as well as the indigenous Chinese principle of essence and function (ti
yong體用). This explains why Zhencheng insists that only thusness (the “real and eternal nature”) can
be categorized as the first kind of permanence—the “immutable continuity” or the “ultimate truth”
that is grasped only by the sage. Meanwhile, he argues that the phenomenal world that is restrained
by the law of cause and result (that is, the “successive continuity”) changes in every instant. This is the
“conventional truth” of the world, as understood by unenlightened people.
As we have seen, Seng Zhao completed The Immutability of Things around 410 CE, prior to the
translation of the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvān. a sūtra. Hence, it is hardly surprising that this sūtra exerted
little or no influence on his thinking. Instead, in all four of his treatises, Seng Zhao remains entirely
faithful to the ideas in the Madhyamaka sūtras that he and his teacher Kumārajı̄va were translating
at the time. To some degree, Zhencheng knew that his approach was different from Seng Zhao’s,
39 CBETA 2019.Q3, X54, no. 879, p. 915a10–16; R97, p. 734a4–10; Z 2:2, p. 367c4–10.
40 In about 416–418 CE, Buddhabhadra佛陀跋陀羅 and Faxian法顯 translated part of this sūtra under the title Dabannihuan jing
大般泥洹經. Some years later, in Liangzhou州, Dharmaks.ema曇無讖 translated more of the text in the Dabanniepan jing大般涅
槃經 or ‘Northern edition of the Mahāparinirvān. a sūtra’北本涅槃經. See cbetaonline.cn/zh/T0007 and cbetaonline.cn/zh/T0374.
41 一切眾生悉有佛性。如來常住無有變易。 CBETA 2020.Q1, T12, no. 374, p. 522c24.
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and he explains their contrasting perspectives with reference to a pair of popular Chinese Buddhist
concepts—bore (般若, prajñā) and niepan (涅槃, nirvān. a):
The prajñā (sūtras) clarify the forms and manifest emptiness, therefore they state that “dharmas
do not leave or come”, which means that if one seeks the characteristics of leaving and
coming, one cannot grasp them. Thus, prajñā does not manifest permanence. The nirvān. a
(sūtras) directly reveal the real nature, so they claim that “permanent abiding is beyond cause
and result” [ . . . ] The essence of nirvān. a that abides permanently, and is not empty, is the
Buddha-nature and the true self in the womb of the Tathāgata, which is firm and immutable,
thus not impermanent. It truly exists with an essence, so it is not empty. The prajñā sūtras do
not mention this.
般若蕩相名空。故說法無去來。謂求去來相不可得。故非謂顯常也。涅槃直示實性。故說常
住非因果[ . . . ]其涅槃常住不空之體是如來藏佛性真我。堅凝不變。則非無常。真實有體。
則非空也。般若經中言未及此。42
Zhencheng uses bore (般若, prajñā) when discussing the teachings of the Indian Madhyamaka中觀
派 tradition and the indigenous Chinese Sanlun school三論宗, and niepan (涅槃, nirvān. a) in reference
to theories that largely conform to the doctrines of the Huayan school (i.e., all things originate from
thusness). One of the main points of contention between these two traditions is that while niepan
scriptures acknowledge the eternal existence of the Buddha-nature in all sentient beings, bore texts
tend to negate any eternal essence, including that of the Buddha-nature.43 Therefore, it seems highly
likely that Zhencheng knew that Seng Zhao never intended to equate “immutability” with any kind
of essential nature of things, as “the sūtras of prajñā do not mention this”. Nevertheless, he criticizes
The Immutability of Things on the basis of Huayan reasoning. This may be explained by the fact that
Chinese Buddhist thought became preoccupied with niepan thinking after the Sanlun school started
to decline at the end of the Tang dynasty (618–907). Indeed, even the Tiantai school天台宗, which
claimed to preserve Sanlun teachings, adopted the theory of intrinsic inclusiveness (xing ju性具)—that
is, the Buddha-nature includes both good and evil—as one of its central tenets.
When Zhencheng turns to the “real meaning” (zhengyi正義) of “immutability”, he begins with a
summary of the relationship between the completely enlightened mind (yuanjue xin圓覺心) and myriad
phenomena (wanxiang萬象). He uses man. i (moni摩尼)—a bright, round jewel that features prominently
in Buddhist texts—as a metaphor for the sage’s wholly enlightened mind, in which the images of
myriad things are perfectly and completely reflected. Unenlightened people who are constrained by
ignorance (wuming無明), on the contrary, take it for granted that these images really exist.44
Next, Zhencheng presents a more detailed analysis based on the concept of the “four dharma-realms”
(si fajie四法界). In this core doctrine of the Huayan school, the four dharma-realms are phenomena
(shi fajie事法界), principle (li fajie理法界), non-obstruction between the principle and the phenomena
(li-shi wuai fajie理事無礙法界), and non-obstruction among the phenomena (shi-shi wuai fajie事事無礙
法界). The concept is designed to illustrate the different levels—from low to high—of philosophical
insight relating to the status of the existence of phenomena and their relationship to the noumenon of
principle. Zhencheng’s use of this framework to explain immutability (or permanence) is illustrated in
the following chart (Figure 2):45
42 CBETA 2019.Q3, X54, no. 879, p. 915b21–22; R97, p. 735a3–4; Z 2:2, p. 368a3–4.
43 See also the DDB entries on空宗 and涅槃宗: http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?q=%E7%A9%BA%E5%
AE%97; http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?q=%E6%B6%85%E6%A7%83%E5%AE%97.
44 CBETA 2019.Q3, X54, no. 879, p. 916b24–c14; R97, p. 737a6–2; Z 2:2, p. 369a6–2.
45 The chart is based on CBETA 2019.Q3, X54, no. 879, pp. 916c14–17a21; R97, pp. 737b02–38a15; Z 2:2, p. 369b2–15.
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Figure 2. A schematic overview of Zhencheng’s understanding of impermanence and
immutability/permanence.
Zhencheng’s “proof” of permanence may be summarized as follows: the conditioned things in
the dharma-realm of phenomena arise dependently and change in every moment, but as they derive
from the emptiness in the dharma-realm of principle (which is similar to the noumenon of thusness in
Huayan thinking, Buddha-nature or the true/one/enlightened mind), the phenomenal things share the
nature of permanent abiding or the immutability of emptiness. Therefore, the relationship between the
noumenon and myriad phenomenal things may be expressed as “all are identical to the one, and the
one is identical to all” (一切即一,一即一切). Within the dharma-realms framework, only emptiness in
the realm of principle truly possesses the trait of immutability or permanence; meanwhile, phenomenal
things should be seen as “immutable” or “permanent” only in the sense that they encompass and
interpenetrate the principle of emptiness.
All of this stands in marked contrast to Seng Zhao’s elaboration of Madhyamaka thinking in The
Immutability of Things, because he makes no mention of anything like Buddha-nature in his explanation
of the phenomenal things. According to Seng Zhao, the only possible methodology leading to emptiness
is emptiness itself. This serves to deflect any alternative positive proposition, and ultimately negates
any attachment to the concept of emptiness itself. In general, while Seng Zhao uses “immutability” and
“mutability” to denote the coexisting and equal characters of all phenomenal things, Zhencheng uses
these terms to denote the discrete dharma-realms of principle and phenomena. To the latter’s mind,
“immutability” has logical priority over “mutability”, so he flatly refuses to describe phenomenal
things as “immutable”.
4. Contemporary Responses to Zhencheng’s Criticism of Seng Zhao
Zhencheng requested feedback from a number of fellow scholar–monks after completing the
main part of A Logical Investigation. Unfortunately for him, their responses were generally negative,
which marked the start of a fierce debate that continued up to and even beyond Zhencheng’s death.
As Daoheng道衡 (n.d.) reported, “After Master Cheng wrote the refutation, there were dozens of
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venerable masters who refuted his refutation.”46 No more than twenty texts by approximately ten of
these monks have survived.
The debate can be divided into two distinct phases, with the first recorded in the second volume of
A Logical Investigation, which includes contributions by “a recent master holding a different view (jinshi
yijie shi近世異解師)”, “a venerable monk without name (wuming zunzhe無名尊者)”, Haiyin Dashi (海
印大士; hereafter Haiyin; n.d.), Mizang Daokai密藏道開 (n.d.), Yihuan Daoren一幻道人 (n.d.), and
Yunqi Zhuhong (云栖祩宏; 1535–1615). Counter-arguments written after Zhencheng completed his
final draft include treatises and discourse records (yulu語錄) by Daoheng, Longchi Huanyou (龍池
幻有; 1549–1614; hereafter Huanyou), Zhenjie真界 (n.d.), Zibo Zhenke (紫柏真可, 1543–1603), and
Deqing. Almost all of these scholar–monks rejected Zhencheng’s assessment of Seng Zhao’s text.
The remainder of this section focuses on the main points of contention raised by Deqing, Haiyin,
and Huanyou.
4.1. Deqing
Although a member of the Linji branch of Chan臨濟宗, Deqing, one of the most influential monks
of his generation, posited himself against the nominal claims of “orthodox” Chan genealogy of dharma
transmission and the iconoclastic style that was popular at the time. The attainment of enlightenment
was viewed as the primary condition for Chan practitioners to gain entry into the genealogy, and the
decline of the tradition prior to the late Ming was reflected in practitioners imitating and plagiarizing
the records of earlier enlightened monks’ deeds and proclamations. In a bid to counter this epidemic of
fakery, Deqing praised the authenticity of individualistic and specific experience in Chan meditation.
Moreover, he suggested combining meditation with other forms of practice, such as Pure Land and
doctrinal studies.
Deqing resided for a time with Zhencheng on Mount Wutai, and he entered the debate over A
Logical Investigation while the latter was still in the process of preparing his manuscript. As mentioned
in the previous section, Zhencheng criticizes The Immutability of Things with reference to the first part
of a paragraph from the Huayan jing suishu yanyi chao. By contrast, Deqing’s A Brief Commentary on the
Zhao Lun (Zhaolun lüezhu肇論略注) focuses on the second part of Chengguan’s analysis, which leads
to the conclusion that Chengguan actually “praises (the arguments) expressed (in The Immutability of
Things) as they subtly conform to the Buddha’s doctrines”.47
Unsurprisingly, given his support for Chengguan’s use of the twofold-truth theory, Deqing’s
defence of Seng Zhao aims to prove that the latter’s understanding of “immutability” belongs in the
realm of ultimate truth or the ‘one mind’ (yixin一心). Indeed, he states that all four of Seng Zhao’s
treatises “take the one mind as their doctrinal foundation” (所宗本乎一心), as does The Awakening
of Faith (Qixin lun起信論).48 He also uses this theory in his analysis of Seng Zhao’s title: “the wu物
refers to the myriad dharmas that are observed, and buqian 不遷 refers to the true characteristic of
every dharma in the essence”; “every dharma is immutable in the essence. It is not (valid to say that) its
characteristic is mutable while its nature is immutable.”49
Later, Deqing suggests that language lacks the capacity to express the “true characteristic” (shixiang
實相) of dharma, because it derives from human consciousness, which rests on false conceptualizations
of external things, whereas the true characteristic of dharma is the inconceivable absolute. He presents
46 澄師駁論以,海尊宿大老,駁其駁者,亡十家。 CBETA 2020.Q1, X54, no. 878, p. 910b8–9; R97, p. 725a2–3; Z 2:2, p. 363a2–3.
47 推其所見妙契佛義也. CBETA 2019.Q3, X54, no. 873, p. 336c21–22; R96, p. 590b6–7; Z 2:1, p. 295d6–7.
48 CBETA 2019.Q3, X54, no. 873, p. 330c9–11; R96, p. 578a12–14; Z 2:1, p. 289c12–14. The Awakening of Faith is one of the
most influential texts on the subject of Buddha-nature theory. It defines the “one mind” as the origin of the world, and
explains that it has two aspects—a thusness aspect (zhenru men真如門) and an arising and ceasing aspect (shengmie men生
滅門)—with the former manifested by the latter. In this sense, the relationship between the two aspects is similar to that
between the two truths.
49 物者。指所觀之萬法。不遷。指諸法當體之實相;法法當體本自不遷。非相遷而性不遷也。 CBETA 2019.Q3, X54, no. 873, p.
332b6–11; R96, p. 581b3–8; Z 2:1, p. 291b3–8.
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several well-known cases (gong’an) of prominent monks comprehending the true characteristic of
dharma through the direct experience of intuition, then criticizes those who “adhere strictly to the
Buddha’s teachings expressed in written words”.50 Of course, Zhencheng falls into the latter category,
as he routinely cites the “teachings of the sage” and “logical inference” in support of his arguments.
Deqing implies that such an approach is counter-productive, as immutability in the nature of things can
be grasped only through personal experience. He then describes how he himself came to comprehend
immutability in the nature of ever-changing things:
Suddenly, the wind blew the trees in the courtyard, and the fallen leaves flew in the air. But I
did not see any leaf moving. Ah, there is faith in “the raging storm that uproots mountains in
fact is calm”. Then (I) went to the toilet to relieve myself, but could not see any characteristic
of “flowing”. (I) exclaimed, “It is true, indeed! The two rivers of China (i.e., the Yangzi and
the Yellow River) rush along and yet do not flow.”
忽風吹庭樹。落葉飛空。則見葉葉不動。信乎。旋嵐偃嶽而常靜也。及登廁去溺。則不見流
相。歎曰。誠哉。江河競注而不流也。51
Clearly, Deqing believed that personally experiencing immutability amid conditional things that,
at first glance, seem to be changing rapidly is a far more persuasive demonstration of the concept
than any amount of rational reasoning based on the study of scriptures. Although he never belittled
doctrinal study, he always insisted it was supplementary to meditation. For example, his treatises on
the subject of Yogācāra philosophy include such caveats as:
(Those who read this) should just enlighten their minds with the help of this treatise, instead
of specifically differentiating the names and characteristics.
正要因此悟心。不是分名相也。52
Those who practice meditation do not need to read Buddhist doctrines widely. With this
treatise, they can verify (their state of) mind in order to prove the depth of their enlightenment.
而参禅之士不假涉教義。即此可以印心。以証悟入之深。53
Deqing succeeded in assimilating Yogācāra analysis of consciousness with the Chan theory
of the one mind. This not only simplified the highly complicated Yogācāra teachings, but also
provided much-needed guidance for Chan practitioners as they attempted to enlighten their minds in
everyday life.
4.2. Haiyin
The correspondence between Zhencheng and a scholar–monk named Haiyin is recorded in the
second volume of A Logical Investigation. Some researchers have suggested that Haiyin was simply
an alternative name for Deqing that reflected his residence at the Haiyin Temple海印寺 on Mount
Lao牢山 in a remote corner of modern-day Shandong Province (e.g., Jiang 2006, p. 344). However,
if that were the case, Deqing must have experienced a profound philosophical conversion, because
Haiyin’s conception of immutability is radically different from the one that Deqing expresses in A Brief
Commentary on Zhao Lun:
50 守教義文字之師。 CBETA 2019.Q3, X54, no. 873, pp. 336c24–37a12; R96, pp. 590b9–91a3; Z 2:1, pp. 295d9–96a3.
51 CBETA 2019.Q3, X54, no. 873, p. 335b4–9; R96, p. 587b1–6; Z 2:1, p. 294b1–6.
52 CBETA 2020.Q3, X55, no. 893, p. 424c2; R98, p. 591b2; Z 2:3, p. 296b2.
53 CBETA 2020.Q3, X55, no. 893, p. 420b21–23; R98, p. 583a15–17; Z 2:3, p. 292a15–17.
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(Master Zhao uses) “immutability” to denote conventional things, and he takes the unreal
for the real. Therefore, it is the thing that is immutable, rather than the truth. As things
are changing (according to regular perception), (Master Zhao) now demonstrates that
immutability is the most profound. If (he regards) the truth as immutable, it does not deserve
mention [ . . . ] Moreover, Master Zhao clearly points out that “immutability” refers to things,
but you (i.e., Zhencheng) falsify him by referring to the truth.
且以不遷當俗。不真為真。由是觀之。是物不遷。非真不遷也。以其物有遷變。故今示之以
不遷為妙。若真不遷。又何足云[ . . . ]且肇公明指不遷在物。而足下以真冤之。54
Haiyin repeatedly emphasizes that Seng Zhao views conventional things, not the truth, as
immutable. Zhencheng then confirms this interpretation in his response to Haiyin’s letter: “Great
Master Haiyin wisely wrote thousands of words in the letter, but his main point is that Master
Zhao proposed immutability based on conventional things, rather than proved the immutability of
thusness.”55 Haiyin comes close to identifying the crux of Seng Zhao and Zhencheng’s disagreement
on the basis of the twofold-truth theory: that is, is it acceptable to use “immutability” in reference to
conventional/phenomenal things (i.e., the opposite of “mutability”) or is it only ever applicable to
the ultimate truth of emptiness (or thusness, Buddha-nature or one mind)? However, his analysis
is constrained by the strict structural separation of the conventional and ultimate truths in Huayan
philosophy, which prevents a Madhyamaka-inspired exploration of the relationship between these two
truths. Zhencheng seizes on this limitation to rebut Haiyin’s critique.
He then tables three questions for Haiyin’s consideration: if conventional things are immutable, is
it because the conventional things are identical to (i.e., share the nature of) the truth and therefore are
immutable? Or is it because they are not identical to the ultimate truth, and are thereby immutable? If
conventional things are identical to the ultimate truth and therefore are immutable, then the ultimate
truth is immutable, and this hypothesis certainly offends against the truth. If conventional things are
not identical to the truth, and one states that they are immutable, then this does not go beyond the
two notions (i.e., understanding) [of Hı̄nayāna or Abhidharma]. Firstly, claiming that conditioned
phenomena are vanishing in an instant, then they do not move to another place from this place; this is
the correct understanding according to Hı̄nayāna. Secondly, stating the nature of each thing is abiding,
then past things do not disappear (lit. transform). Then the nature abides in the past and therefore is
immutable. This is the eternalist view of the heretics.56
Haiyin, along with most of Zhencheng’s Chan opponents, also criticizes him for obsessively
focusing on a few specific words in The Immutability of Things, seemingly with little regard for Seng
Zhao’s overall intent. In his defence, Zhencheng refers to the relationship between “word” (yan言)
and “meaning” (yi 意)—a recurring Chinese philosophical concern since the Neo-Daoist era. He
argues: “Words are the traces of the mind, and the mind is the origin of the words. It is called such
‘since (their) minds appreciate the non-existence, when encountering something (they) often speak
in a way of obeying the non-existence’. Thus, by comprehending somebody’s words, (you will)
certainly comprehend his mind; based on the traces, (you will) understand the origin.”57 Following
54 CBETA 2019.Q3, X54, no. 879, p. 924a21–b5; R97, p. 752a10–18; Z 2:2, p. 376c10–18.
55 海印大士慧書千言。其要則言肇公約俗物立不遷。非真如不遷也。 CBETA 2019.Q3, X54, no. 879, p. 924b6–7; R97, p.
752b1–2; Z 2:2, p. 376d1–2.
56 今更詰之曰。肇公俗物不遷。為此俗物即真故不遷耶。為不即真而不遷耶。若俗物即真故不遷者。則真不遷矣。而論固
違真。若俗物不即真而言不遷者。然不出二義。一謂有為之法剎那滅。故不從此方遷至餘方。此小乘正解也。二謂物各
性住。昔物不化。性住於昔故不遷。此外道常見也。CBETA 2020.Q3, X54, no. 879, p. 924b8-13; R97, p. 752b3-8; Z 2:2,
p. 376d3-8.
57 夫言者心之跡。心者言之本。所謂心尚無。多觸言以賓無。故得其言必得其心。因跡以見其本也。 CBETA 2019.Q3, X54,
no. 879, p. 924c6–7; R97, p. 753a7–8; Z 2:2, p. 377a7–8. Zhencheng cites “心尚無。多觸言以賓無” from another Zhao lun
treatise, On Śūnyatā. The original sentence is “本無者,情尚於無,多觸言以賓無”, which Seng Zhao uses to explain the benwu
zong本無宗 proposal (CBETA 2020.Q1, T45, no. 1858, p. 152a19–20). As for the word bin賓, Yuan Kang元康, a Tang dynasty
monk who annotated the Zhao lun, explains: “Bin means guest, and the guest faces towards the direction of the host賓者,客
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this affirmation of words’ effectiveness, Zhencheng answers his critics by pointing out that if people
could directly comprehend words’ meaning while neglecting the written words themselves, then
the teachings of every Buddhist or non-Buddhist school could be regarded as the ultimate truth.58
Moreover, if that were the case, Haiyin would be unable to criticize him, because it would be impossible
for him to demonstrate that he had correctly grasped Seng Zhao’s true meaning in The Immutability of
Things, while Zhencheng had not. This is a crucial point, because it highlights the fact that all attempts
to determine “original meaning” are futile unless readers first accept that words are a valid means of
communicating an author’s ideas.
4.3. Huanyou
For many years, another of Zhencheng’s critics, Huanyou, was widely regarded as the leading
dharma heir of the Linji master Xiaoyan Debao (笑嚴德; 1512–1581), not least because several of his own
disciples played key roles in the revival of the Linji branch. Notwithstanding recent challenges to this
designation (Jiang 2008, pp. 301–6), Huanyou was certainly an erudite scholar, as his correspondence
with Zhencheng testifies.
Unfortunately, Zhencheng did not include any of Huanyou’s correspondence in his “Reply to
Chan Master Huanyou”答幻有禪師書 in A Logical Investigation, so most of our insights into the latter’s
thinking are based on his treatises.59 The two men’s debate revolved around the relationship between
xingzhu性住 (“nature abides”) and xingkong性空 (“emptiness of nature”): while Zhencheng insisted
that these two ideas are “contradictory and conflict with each other” (diti huwei敵體互違), Huanyou
believed that they are “an integrated body of the true characteristic” (yiti shixiang一體實相). The latter
built his case by dissecting three of Zhencheng’s main points of contention in A Logical Investigation.
Each of these is examined in turn below.
a. Challenge the application of the twofold-truth theory and Zhencheng’s interpretation of
“immutability”
As we have seen, there is a subtle contradiction in Chengguan’s appraisal of The Immutability of
Things in the Huayan jing suishu yanyi chao. On the one hand, he insists that the theory of twofold truth
should be used only to distinguish The Immutability of Things from another of Seng Zhao’s treatises, On
Śūnyatā, as it is only in the latter that Seng Zhao explains the concept of emptiness or the ultimate truth.
On the other hand, he states that The Immutability of Things “regards the ultimate truth as immutability,
while not showing the characteristic of the ultimate truth”, which seems to imply that “immutability”
does precisely denote the ultimate truth. In other words, Chengguan is rather ambivalent on the
question of whether “immutability” equates to the ultimate truth. By contrast, Huanyou is certain that
The Immutability of Things is concerned solely with the realm of conventional truth.
Furthermore, Huanyou points out that Seng Zhao never violated the teaching of emptiness,
even though he used the notion of immutability to “correct” unenlightened people’s attachment to
mutability through the expedient means (upāya) of conventional language and concepts. Once again,
this comment could be interpreted as a mild rebuke of Chengguan, on the grounds that he was such a
staunch advocate of immutability that he strayed from the Middle Way of emptiness, which aims to
eliminate all attachment (including attachment to the notion of immutability).
After highlighting this “erroneous” tendency in Chengguan’s commentary, Huanyou turns his
attention to Zhencheng:
也,客皆向主”. In addition, he cites the book of Erya爾雅 when suggesting that the same term may be used as a verb: “Bin
means ‘obey’賓,服也” (CBETA 2020.Q1, T45, no. 1859, p. 171c26–29).
58 若果如是。即九十六種之言與夫百家世諦之談。苟能忘之。皆第一義。又奚止肇公之言哉。 CBETA 2020.Q1, X54, no. 879,
p. 924c3–5; R97, p. 753a4–6; Z 2:2, p. 377a4–6.
59 Primarily Refutation (Boyu駁語), An Analysis of “Nature Abides” (Xingzhu shi性住釋) and The Main Ideas of the Immutability of
Things (Wu buqian lun tizhi物不遷論題旨) in the Longchi Huanyou chanshi yulu龍池幻有禪師語錄. See cbetaonline.cn/zh/L1637.
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Although (Chengguan) improperly used the “ultimate truth” and “conventional truth” to
prove (Seng Zhao’s) intention in The Immutability of Things, he did not incorrectly interpret
the word “mutability” as “disappear” (mie 滅) or “transform” (hua 化). Now, Kongyin
(i.e., Zhencheng) is different. He definitively regards “mutability” as “disappearing” and
“transforming” [ . . . ] (Zhencheng) misrepresents the statement “existing in the past while
not existing in the present” as the dharma of impermanence and hence a demonstration of
immutability. But this demonstration is invalid, because it is redundant. This is because
the “immutability of things” refers only to “not leaving or coming”, and the coexistence of
movement and stillness, not to impermanent arising and ceasing.
雖以真諦俗諦而誤證物不遷歸旨不合。未謬解遷字為滅化義也。今空印則不然。務以論題遷
字斷斷乎為滅也。化也[ . . . ]曲引向有今無為無常法證不遷者。此證不成。乃贅且剩也。物
不遷唯指無去來,即動靜。非以無常生滅為論也。60
Here, Huanyou’s argument rests on careful consideration of three seemingly identical—but
actually subtly different—terms. As he points out, qian遷, the core concept in The Immutability of Things,
relates to the actions of phenomenal things, whereas mie滅 and hua化, in the Buddhist discourse, are
always linked with the impermanence of conventional things. By distinguishing “mutability” from the
notions of “disappearing” and “transforming”, Huanyou narrows The Immutability of Things’ scope to
“movement and stillness”, which leads to the accusation that Zhencheng is guilty of overinterpretation
by equating “immutability” with “permanence”. While Seng Zhao uses the concept of “nature
abides” to explain the stillness of phenomenal things—which was later negated as they acquired
self-nature—Zhencheng attempts to demonstrate that phenomenal things are impermanent and lack
self-nature. These two propositions relate to different topics in different realms, so they are not actually
contradictory, but Zhencheng’s criticism is invalid and unjustified, because he misunderstands The
Immutability of Things’ core concept.
b. Challenge Zhencheng’s interpretation of “past causes never disappear”
As discussed earlier, Zhencheng argues that the phrase “past causes never disappear” will lead to
the erroneous assumption that “practices as causes can never achieve results”, because readers will
conclude there is no time left for results to arise if past causes occupy both the present and the future. In
response, Huanyou stresses that Seng Zhao never claimed that past causes the present or the future to
move.61 He accounts for Zhencheng’s misinterpretation of this part of the treatise by highlighting the
latter’s use of the theory of “two kinds of permanence” to attack Seng Zhao’s views on cause and result.
This, Huanyou suggests, reveals that Zhencheng’s analysis is based on the incorrect assumption that
The Immutability of Things is a treatise on the permanence of conventional things, whereas, in actuality,
Seng Zhao’s sole focus is on the theme of “time”.
c. Prove that Seng Zhao’s assertion that “each nature of the thing abides in one time period”
conforms to the “eight negations of the Middle Way”
In order to demonstrate that the “nature abides” concept accords with Mahāyāna teaching,
Huanyou first explains the relationship between “time” and “thing”, then argues that this is consistent
with the “eight negations of the Middle Way”, as outlined in the MMK:62
60 CBETA 2019.Q3, L153, no. 1637, pp. 646b15–47a12.
61 論中分明謂。果不俱因。因因而果。因因而果。因不昔滅。果不俱因。因不來今。不滅不來。則不遷之致明矣。何嘗
謂。因復來今而不滅耶。因既未嘗來今。何眾生永無成佛之理。何修因永無得果之期。 CBETA 2020.Q1, L153, no. 1637,
p. 649b2–6.
62 For more information on the ‘eight negations’, see note 37 and the main text that precedes it.
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“Time period” means “at the time of (a thing)”. Thus, a time period cannot exist without
the thing, and a thing cannot be separated from the time period. As such, (we) know that
the time exists only if the thing exists, and if the time vanishes, the thing would also be
extinguished. So why should (we) not say that “nature abides in one time period”?
夫世者當時之謂。由是知世不能外物。物又安能離世。所以知物在時亦在。時亡則物亦亡。
安得不可謂性住一世耶。63
As discussed earlier, Chapter 2 of the MMK divides the concept of “movement” into three distinct
elements: the mover, the moving time, and the act of moving. Huanyou mirrors this technique by
dividing “nature abides in one time period” into the thing, the abiding time, and the act of abiding.
Then, in another nod to Nāgārjuna, he explains that the thing and the abiding time depend on each
other. Furthermore, he confirms that the “nature abides in one time period” concept accords with the
“eight negations” by addressing each of the latter in turn: first, nothing comes from outside of a time
period, so the concept conforms to “non-appearance” (bu lai不來); second, nothing is able to free itself
from the restriction of a time period, so it also conforms to “non-disappearance” (bu qu不去); third, as
the time and the thing are interdependent, they are different yet linked, so their relationship accords
with both “non-identity” (bu yi不一) and “non-difference” (bu yi不異); fourth, as the time and the
thing are inextricably bound to each other, neither can arise independently or last permanently by
itself, and neither can be destroyed or cease if the other continues to exist, so their existence conforms
to “non-arising” (bu sheng不生), “non-ceasing” (bu mie不滅), “non-annihilation” (bu duan不斷), and
“non-permanence” (bu chang不常). According to Huanyou, the essence of these eight negations is
inherently coherent as they are rooted in the “one reality of the uncreated” (wusheng yishi無生一實).64
Huanyou elaborates on some other valuable ideas in his personal discourse records. For
example, he argues that relative and opposite conceptions are restricted to the conventional world,
while the ultimate truth is beyond all relativity.65 Therefore, it is inappropriate to use the term
“immutability”—the opposite of conventional things’ “mutability”—to denote the ultimate truth.
In other words, any differentiation between mutability and immutability must be confined to the
realm of phenomena. Nevertheless, Huanyou found it impossible to shed his Huayan and Chan
Buddhist background entirely, or to comprehend Seng Zhao’s treatise in purely Madhyamaka terms.
This is especially evident during his discussions of the concept of the mind,66 and when he draws
parallels between “mysterious comprehension” (shenhui神會) in The Immutability of Things and “subtle
contemplation” (miaoguan妙觀) in Chan meditation.67
In summary, all three of the scholar–monks discussed here challenged Zhencheng’s assessment
of The Immutability of Things for the same three reasons. First, they all believed that the theory of
twofold truth was key to resolving the “nature abides” (Seng Zhao)/“emptiness of nature” (Zhencheng)
conflict. Second, on the issue of “words and meanings”, while Zhencheng insisted that words are an
effective means through which authors are able to communicate their ideas, his Chan rivals felt that full
comprehension of meaning cannot be achieved merely by reading an author’s words in a text. Finally,
Zhencheng was a devotee of Yogācāra formal logic and the Huayan theory of the “four dharma-realms”,
whereas most of his opponents favored direct awareness and meditation practice. Huanyou was an
63 CBETA 2019.Q3, L153, no. 1637, p. 665a7–10.
64 Wusheng無生 (lit. “uncreated/unborn”) equates to “emptiness” in the sense that the original quality of all things is emptiness,
and there is no such thing as arising, changing or ceasing.
65 况肇公分明云。以性空言去不必去。以性住言住不必住。既言去住之不必者。知皆因對待言也。以對待言。故是知即去住
而非去住也。 CBETA 2019.Q3, L153, no. 1637, p. 672b5–9.
66 For example, in one passage he asserts, ‘Once you see the broad essence of mind, you will recognize that “one thing abides
in a period of time”, as stated by Master Zhao, is not beyond the mind. Nor does it differ from “the dharma abides and is
established” in Fahua jing倘爾見得廣大心體了。便識得肇公性住一世。亦不出心外。既知得性住一世不出吾心。即與法華
法住法位有何揀別’ (CBETA 2019.Q3, L153, no. 1637, p. 664b11–13).
67 可以神會,難以事求。可以神會者,是吾儕禪寂中妙觀也。 CBETA 2019.Q3, L153, no. 1637, p. 649a7–8.
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exception, as his analysis was based on the dialectical method and the “eight negations” of the MMK,
one of the main Madhyamaka sūtras.
In short, Zhencheng attempted to resolve late Ming Buddhism’s legitimacy crisis through doctrinal
study, Deqing preferred meditation, and Huanyou felt that a combination of the two was the best
course of action.
5. Conclusions
There were two crucial philosophical developments in Chinese Buddhism and Neo-Daoism in
Seng Zhao’s lifetime: the “six houses and seven schools” of Buddhism’s deliberations on how to
understand the term “emptiness”; and Wang Bi and Guo Xiang’s in-depth metaphysical explorations
of the concepts of “existence” (you 有) and “non-existence” (wu 無). In his treatises, Seng Zhao
skilfully utilized the wisdom of the Madhyamaka Middle Way to transcend the Neo-Daoist dualistic
assumptions of you and wu; meanwhile, he also clarified the discussions among the “six houses and
seven schools” by interpreting “emptiness” on the basis of “dependent arising”. Embedded within
this febrile intellectual atmosphere, he wrote The Immutability of Things with the dual aims of proving
the coexistence of stillness and movement in the phenomenal world, and transcending the extreme
concepts of mutability and immutability.
The Chinese philosophical community was no less turbulent more than a thousand years later,
when Zhencheng composed his fierce critique of Seng Zhao’s treatise. Buddhism was enjoying a
significant revival after a long period of decline as a result of the generous patronage of the imperial
court, but it was also embroiled in a crisis of legitimacy due to the lengthy suspension of Buddhist
traditions. A remedy was clearly necessary, but Buddhist scholars could not agree on the best approach:
some advocated authentic enlightenment through meditation, while others felt the answer could
be found in detailed analysis of the ancient scriptures. Zhencheng was a typical late Ming Huayan
scholar–monk. Although guided by the doctrines of his own school, he also made full use of Yogācāra
argumentation and formal logic techniques to challenge Seng Zhao’s ideas. Specifically, with reference
to Buddha-nature, the twofold truth and the four dharma-realms, he highlighted what he viewed as
three major flaws in The Immutability of Things: (1) immutability cannot prove permanence; (2) Seng
Zhao’s use of “existence” and “non-existence”; and (3) a break in the logical chain that connects the
cause to the result.
A host of Zhencheng’s contemporaries subsequently voiced their opposition to his analysis, most
notably Deqing, Haiyin, and Huanyou. Each of these scholar–monks offered a fresh interpretation
of “immutability” on the basis of the theory of the twofold truth. In particular, Huanyou advanced
the debate by clarifying some key terms, scrutinizing the law of cause and result and exploring the
theory of twofold truth itself, mainly through use of the dialectic method and with reference to the
“eight negations”. However, all of these “opponents” were more or less rooted in the doctrine of
Buddha-nature, just as Zhencheng was, so they were unable to comprehend The Immutability of Things
purely in the framework of Madhyamaka discourse.
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